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THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF
STANDING IN IN RE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC
CONFERENCE*: ANOTHER PLEA FOR CLARITY
AND CONSISTENCY
INTRODUCTION
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)
offers tax-exempt status to groups "organized and operated ex-
clusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literacy, or educational purposes . ."' Under section
170 of the Code, donations to most organizations meeting sec-
tion 501(c)(3) are tax-deductible. 2 Given the incentive that sec-
tion 170 provides to those desiring to make donations to such
groups, organizations seeking such donations are strongly moti-
vated not only to achieve but to maintain the privileges that sec-
tion 501(c)(3) affords.3
The qualifications for establishing and maintaining section
501(c)(3) status are not, however, directed simply at the pur-
poses of the organization. Section 501(c)(3) also limits the means
by which an organization may advance those purposes. Under
* 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989) (before Newman, Kearse and Cardamone, JJ.; op-
inion per Cardamone, J., dissent per Newman, J.).
1 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). The income tax regulations provide that "[ijn order
to be exempt as an organization described in section 501(c)(3)," an organization must
satisfy both an "organizational" and an "operational" test. Tress. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1.(a)(1) (as amended in 1990). To satisfy the organizational test, the organization's arti-
cles of incorporation must "[limit the purposes of such organization to one or more
exempt purposes; and.., not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise
than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes." Tress. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1.(a)(2)(b)(1)(i)(a) & (b) (as amended in 1990). Under the operational test, an organiza-
tion must engage "primarily in activities which accomplish one or more ... exempt pur-
poses specified in section 501(c)(3)." Trees. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in
1990).
26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1988) (listing permissible tax-deductible donations).
* The tremendous practical importance of section 501(c)(3) status is discussed in
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 727-30 (1974) (in addition to being exempt from
federal income taxes, § 501(c)(3) organizations are also exempt from federal social secur-
ity (FICA) taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(8)(B), and from federal unemployment
(FUTA) taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8); donations to § 501(c)(3) organizations are
tax-deductible under § 170(c)(2) of the Code).
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section 501(c)(3), an organization may not devote a "substantial
part" of its activities to "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation . . . ." Furthermore, the or-
ganization may "not participate in, or intervene in (including
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office." 5 The IRS's enforcement-or more accurately, nonen-
forcement-of these prohibitions, and the attempts by third
parties to use the judiciary to cure this selective nonenforcement
problem, as exemplified in the recent Second Circuit case of In
re United States Catholic Conference, are the subjects of this
Comment.6
The IRS has long been accused of closing its eyes to viola-
tions of section 501(c)(3), especially those violations committed
by well-established religious organizations. A similar level of
tolerance has not been afforded smaller, less influential section
501(c)(3) organizations.' The controversy surrounding abortion
4 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). There is no bright-line test to determine what consti-
tutes a "substantial part" of an organization's activities. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry,
Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972) (a percentage test to determine
what is substantial ignores the necessity of examining the organization's activities in re-
lation to the objectives of the organization and the circumstances surrounding those ac-
tivities), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). The determination is made by measuring the
organization's lobbying activities relative to the organization's overall activities. Haswell
v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
The political limitations embodied in § 501(c)(3) have attracted a significant amount
of commentary, most of it critical. See, e.g., Caplin & Timbie, Legislative Activities of
Public Charities, 39 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 183 (1975); Chisolm, Exempt Organization
Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201 (1987-88); Clark, The
Limitation On Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L.
REv. 439 (1960); Troyer, Charities, Law-Making and the Constitution: Validity of the
Restrictions on Influencing Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N 1415 (1973); Note,
Charitable Lobbying Restraints and Tax Exempt Organizations: Old Problems, New
Directions?, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 337.
The lobbying limitations have been attacked on a number of grounds. Critics claim
that the limitation violates First Amendment speech and associational rights and is over-
broad and vague. But see Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983) (the lobbying limitations in § 501 do not violate either the First or Fifth Amend-
ments). For a detailed analysis of decisions dealing with this issue, see Schwarz & Hut-
ton, Recent Developments in Tax Exempt Organizations, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 649 (1984).
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
6 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989).
See Schwarz & Hutton, Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 668.
8 See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.
1972) (tax-exempt organization is regarded as attempting to influence legislation con-
trary to § 501(c)(3) if it contacts or urges public to contact members of legislative body
(Vol. 67: 429
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has brought this unequal enforcement of the Code's prohibitions
against lobbying and political campaigning to a head.
The Catholic Church (the Church) has reputedly used tax-
deductible funds to engage in political activities in violation of
section 501(c)(3).9 Nevertheless, its tax-exempt status remains
secure. Pro-choice groups, however, risk their tax-exempt status
by displaying even the slightest appearance of electioneering.10
The practical significance of this discriminatory enforce-
for purpose of proposing, supporting or opposing legislation, or itself advocates adoption
or rejection of legislation), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); see also United States v.
Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981) (an otherwise exempt organization loses its ex-
emption by participating in any political campaign), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982),
reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982); Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068,
1072 (6th Cir. 1974) (taxpayer's "failure to satisfy any one of the statutory require-
ments" causes loss of the exemption); Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d
800 (Ct. CL 1961) (IRS revoked tax exemption on theory that corporation was no longer
operating solely for religious purposes), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962); Freedom
Church of Revelation v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D.D.C. 1984) (if nonex-
empt activities of organization are "more than incidental or insubstantial, it is not enti-
fled to continuing qualification as an exempt organization"); Church of the Chosen Peo-
ple v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (D. Minn. 1982) (religious organization
engaged in political activities is denied tax exemption even if activities were religiously
motivated).
9 See note 42 and accompanying text infra. See also Lader, Church Political; Reli-
gious Groups Rights to Endorse Political Candidates, NATioN, May 21, 1990, at 693
("[The plaintiffs in In re United States Catholic Conference] had collected scores of
articles from official Catholic newspapers listing names of candidates to support or op-
pose .... "); Victor, Not Praying Together, Nat'l J., Oct. 10, 1987, at 2546 (the alleged
violations of this prohibition include the endorsement of Reagan in an official church
newspaper, calling him "the only presidential candidate who is dearly opposed to abor-
tion and is willing to use the political power of the presidency to support his position").
In United States v. Dykema the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that in
determining whether a church claiming exempt status was operated exclusively for reli-
gious purposes, it is necessary and proper for the IRS to survey all the activities of the
organization, by receiving testimony by persons having knowledge of the activities, and
by examining church bulletins, programs, and other publications as well as minutes,
memoranda, and financial books and records. Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1100. Subject to cer-
tain restrictions, 26 U.S.C. § 7611(b) expressly permits the examination of even the reli-
gious activities of an organization to the extent such examination is necessary to deter-
mine whether the organization is entitled to exempt status by reason of being a church.
Furthermore, the IRS has a monitoring function with respect to all § 501(c) exempt
groups to determine whether their actual activities conform to the requirements Con-
gress established as entitling them to tax-exempt status. Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1101. In
addition, the IRS has a statutory duty ex officio to inquire "concerning all perons...
who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax." 26 U.S.C. § 7601(a) (1988); see
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523 (1971) (§ 7601 "flatly imposes upon the
Secretary the duty to canvass and to inquire").
10 See note 8 and accompanying text supra; see also Schwarz & Hutton, Recent
Developments, supra note 4, at 668.
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ment of the Code is profound. By allowing the Church to use
funds acquired through tax exemption in an illegal manner, the
tax exemption acts as a federal subsidy of the Church's political
goals.11 Such a "subsidy" serves to increase the effectiveness of
the Church's voice in the competitive political arena. Pro-choice
organizations, on the other hand, refused a similar subsidy by
the IRS, have their political power comparatively diminished.
Individuals and organizations adversely affected by IRS ac-
tivities such as these have turned to the federal courts for re-
dress.12 Unfortunately, such violations of the Code are virtually
immune from judicial review.13 Despite the probability of actual
harm resulting from the IRS's inaction, third parties attempting
to challenge the IRS's enforcement of section 501(c)(3) have re-
peatedly been denied access to the federal courts. Courts have
generally held that these third parties have failed to meet the
constitutional requirements of standing.14 Such a fate met the
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference.
In Catholic Conference a consortium of twenty individuals
and nine organizations brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.15 Asserting that
11 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983)
(the tax exemption and charitable deduction are a type of subsidy administered through
the tax system having much the same effect as a cash grant); Haswell v. United States,
500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (limitations in § 501(c)(3) stem from the policy that
the government should be neutral in political affairs).
12 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that any "person . . . ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute"
may seek judicial review of that agency action in federal court. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
13 Because judicial review under the APA is limited to the federal courts, see note
12 supra, a plaintiff seeking redress must satisfy Article III's standing requirements. See
notes 85-106 and accompanying text infra. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972). State courts provide no help to a plaintiff seeking review of agency
action.
14 See Coyle, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative Agency Ac-
tions, 76 CAL'F. L. REv. 1061, 1063-65 (1988) (constitutional standing requirements make
it exceedingly difficult for third parties to challenge violations by the IRS).
When faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the court must accept all
of the plaintiffs' allegations as true and draw all inferences in their favor. See Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
15 Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), on
reh'g, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), parallel proceeding, Abortion Rights Mobiliza.
tion, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), on appeal sub nom. In re United
States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom, United
States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 484 U.S. 975 (1987),
[Vol. 57: 429
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the Catholic Church had engaged in lobbying and campaigning
in contravention of section 501(c)(3), the plaintiffs sought, inter
alia, to compel the IRS to revoke the Church's tax-exempt sta-
tus."8 The district court, addressing the defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of standing, held that the twenty individual
plaintiffs had standing as voters to contest the alleged infringe-
ment of their right to participate equally in the political process
free from arbitrary government interference. 7 In addition, three
of the nine organizational plaintiffs had standing to represent
their voter members.18 Moreover, the court determined that a
fourth organization, an abortion clinic, and plaintiffs who were
members of the clergy, had standing under the Establishment
Clause. 9 Following numerous intermediate proceedings, the case
came before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.20 The Second Circuit, in the opinion that is the subject
of this Comment, reversed the district court, holding that none
of the plaintiffs had met the constitutional requirements for
standing.2s
In critiquing that opinion, Part I of this Comment will dis-
cuss the rights provided and the limitations imposed by the doc-
trine of standing. Part H will discuss the Second Circuit's use of
rev'd and remanded, 487 U.S. 72 (1988) (Court remanded to the Second Circuit for reso-
lution of subject matter jurisdiction; see notes 82-84 and accompanying text infra), reu'd,
885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989).
16 544 F. Supp. at 473.
This Comment will refer to the individuals and organizations that initiated this ac-
tion collectively as "plaintiffs." Because the plaintiffs sought standing under a variety of
theories, an individual or organization that was granted standing as a voter may also, for
example, have been granted standing under the Establishment Clause. Thus, overlaps
may, and did, exist. When the identity of a specific individual or organization is material
to this Comment, that plaintiff's identity will be noted. See note 35 infra.
17 544 F. Supp. at 480-82; see also note 59 and accompanying text infra.
19 544 F. Supp. at 480; see also note 60 and accompanying text infra.
1" 544 F. Supp. at 479. "The clergy plaintiffs and the Women's Center for Reproduc-
tive Health... have disclosed... compelling and personalized injuries flowing from the
tacit government endorsement of the Roman Catholic Church position on abortion that
are sufficient to confer standing on them to complain of the alleged establishment clause
violations." Id.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states in relevant part that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ..... U.S. CoNsr.
amend. L Governmental action that, either directly or indirectly serves to further one
religion at the expense of others, violates this clause. See notes 108-23 and accompanying
text infra.
' See notes 15 supra and 57-84 and accompanying text infra.
21 In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989).
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standing in Catholic Conference and will analyze, as did the
Second Circuit, whether the instant plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the tax-exempt status of the Church. As will be shown,
the individuals who asserted standing as voters and competitive
advocates of the Church satisfied the requirements necessary to
establish standing.
Furthermore, this Comment will attempt to demonstrate
the injustice that results from such a misapplication of the
standing doctrine. A determination that a plaintiff lacks stand-
ing deprives that plaintiff of judicial redress for an arguably real
injury. Because standing is an inherently flexible concept, a
court may find that a particular litigant lacks standing simply to
avoid hearing the merits of a highly sensitive case. While stand-
ing is a limitation on the judiciary's power, it should not be em-
ployed arbitrarily to deny an injured litigant the right to seek
redress. Standing should not be used to allow an arguably politi-
cally sensitive judiciary to impose limits on its own power to re-
solve disputes when such limitations do not, in fact, exist.
Therefore, although standing is a limiting doctrine, this Com-
ment will, in conclusion, implore our judiciary to clarify standing
in general and to allow the doctrine to function as a means by
which an injured plaintiff can seek relief, not as a court's shield.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Plaintiffs
In re United States Catholic Conference was instituted in
the Southern District of New York by nine organizations and
twenty individuals committed to sustaining a woman's right to
obtain a legal abortion.22 Some of the original plaintiffs were de-
nied standing and therefore were not participants in the appeal
that came before the Second Circuit.2 3 Of the nine organiza-
22 544 F. Supp. at 471.
21 Of the nine original organizational plaintiffs that initiated the action, the district
court held that five abortion clinics lacked standing and dismissed their complaints. 544
F. Supp. at 479 nn.5 & 6. The district court found those five organizational plaintiffs had
failed to set out the injury in fact to themselves or to their members that was necessary
to confer standing under the Establishment Clause. Id. Their allegations merely demon.
strated a concern for the separation of church and state. No direct injury was asserted.
See notes 108-23 and accompanying text infra. In an attempt to lend both clarity and
organization to the Second Circuit's decision, this Comment will discuss only those
[Vol. 57: 429
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tional plaintiffs that the district court considered, four were
granted standing.24 The first of these organizations, the
Women's Center for Reproductive Health (the Center), is dedi-
cated to assisting women in making decisions concerning family
life, including childbearing.2 5 The Center was founded and is run
by Reverend Marvin G. Lutz, a Presbyterian minister .2  Based
on the organization's religious affiliation and goals, standing was
conferred to challenge the government's alleged violations of the
Establishment Clause.27
The three remaining organizations that were granted stand-
ing were Abortion Rights Mobilization Inc. (ARM), the National
Women's Health Network Inc. (NWHN), and the Long Island
National Organization for Women-Nassau, Inc. (Nassau-
NOW) .2  ARM is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization under
section 501(c) (3) that "seeks to secure and implement a woman's
right to a legal abortion. '29 As mentioned, section 501(c)(3) pro-
hibits ARM from engaging in political activity. NWHN, like
ARM, is tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3).30 NWHN is an or-
ganization comprised of many clinics, counseling services, pub-
lishers and others who offer a variety of services to women and
plaintiffs who were granted standing by the district court and who were considered by
the court of appeals.
2, 544 F. Supp. at 479-83.
25 Id. at 479-80.
28 Id. at 480.
Id. at 479-80. The Women's Center for Reproductive Health (the Center) is dedi-
cated to putting "the principles of the Presbyterian Church into effect." Id. at 480. The
Center was granted standing because, according to the district court, "[t]acit government
endorsement of the ... Church view of abortion hampers and frustrates these plaintiffs'
ministries. The government['s] ... official approval of an orthodoxy antithetical to their
spiritual mission diminishes their position in the community, encumbers their calling in
life, and obstructs their ability to communicate effectively their religious message." Id.
The district court held that this favoritism injured the plaintiffs' spiritual values and
thus provided the Center with a sufficient stake in the controversy to merit judicial re-
dress. See notes 85-101 and accompanying text infra.
Such favoritism of one orthodoxy over another is, unquestionably, a violation of the
Establishment Clause. See note 19 supra. Nevertheless, such a violation does not neces-
sarily mean that an individual or organization has standing to challenge that violation. A
prospective plaintiff claiming standing under the Establishment Clause must demon-
strate that an Establishment Clause violation resulted in an individual, ascertainable
injury. The instant plaintiffs failed to do so according to the Second Circuilt. See notes
108-23 and accompanying text infra.
1 544 F. Supp. at 479-83.
s9 Id. at 474.
30 Id.
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support a woman's right to have a legal abortion .3 Nassau-NOW
is a membership organization that shares ARM's and NWHN's
objectives.32 It is exempt from federal taxes under section
501(c)(4) of the Code rather than section 501(c)(3).,3 ARM,
NWHN, and Nassau-NOW were granted standing to represent
their voter members.3 4
The twenty individual plaintiffs that initially joined in the
suit and were granted standing by the district court included
Protestant ministers, Jewish rabbis, and various citizens dedi-
cated to the preservation of women's rights. Many of the indi-
vidual plaintiffs had donated money to or had served as direc-
tors of the organizational plaintiffs.3 5  All of the individual
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(4) offers tax exemptions to "[c]ivic leagues or organizations
not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or
local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which
are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes," Nassau-
NOW is a "local association"; the other organizational plaintiffs are not and therefore do
not qualify for an exemption under § 501(c)(4).
Although it appears that § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations are prohibited from
"direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office," Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1991),
the IRS has ruled that there is no such absolute ban as long as the organization remains
primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare. See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1
C.B. 332.
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation, the Supreme Court stated that §
501(c)(3) organizations may create § 501(c)(4) affiliates to carry out their lobbying. 461
U.S. 540, 544 (1983). Section 501(c)(3) organizations may not, however, subsidize §
501(c)(4) organizations in any way. Id. In addition, exempt organizations may create po-
litical action committees (PACs) to participate in the political process. PACs are not,
however, eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (1988).
An organization that qualifies for an exemption under § 501(c)(3) and loses that
exemption because of its political activities cannot reorganize under § 501(c)(4). 26
U.S.C. § 504(a) (1988).
" See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
3" 544 F. Supp. at 474. The individual plaintiffs included the following: Lawrenco
Lader, founder and president of ARM; Harold Bostrom, Margaret Strahl, M.D., Helen
Edey, M.D., and Ruth Smith-all of whom had contributed to ARM, other abortion
rights organizations, and pro-choice political candidates; Rabbi Israel Margolies, Rever-
end Beatrice Blair, Rabbi Balfour Brickner, Reverend Robert Hare, and Reverend Mar-
vin Lutz-all of whom have religious beliefs differing from those of the Catholic Church
on the issue of abortion and who have been active in the pro-choice movement; Milan
Vuitch, M.D., president of Laurel Clinic, Inc., a clinic that offers a wide variety of medi-
cal services including abortions; Jane Delgado, Jennie Lifrieri, Eileen Walsh, Patricia
Luciano, Marcella Michaski, Chris Niebrzydowski, and Judith Seibel-all of whom are
Roman Catholics who contribute or have contributed to the Catholic Church but are
[Vol. 57:429
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plaintiffs had expressed a concern for the separation of church
and state required by the Establishment Clause." All of the in-
dividual plaintiffs voted and paid taxes.
B. The Dispute
The original individual and organizational plaintiffs brought
suit- collectively against Donald T. Regan, then Secretary of the
Treasury, Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the United States Catholic Conference, Inc., and the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops (the latter two referred
to herein as "the Church").38 The crux of the plaintiffs' chal-
lenge concerned the Church's alleged politically partisan activi-
ties, section 501(c)(3)'s prohibitions against such activities, and
the effect of the Internal Revenue's enforcement-or, as the
plaintiffs claimed, nonenforcement-of those prohibitions
against the Church. 8
Plaintiffs first alleged that the Church repeatedly violated
section 501(c)(3) by engaging in campaigning and lobbying. The
complaint asserted that the Church lobbied extensively, in con-
travention of section 501, to promote the position that abortion
is immoral and should, as a result, be illegal.40 The Church, ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, is engaged in a "three-fold educational,
pastoral, and political" plan designed to mobilize the entire
Church in an effort to outlaw abortions in the United States.'
While such activities would not normally be prohibited, this
"Pastoral Plan for Pro-life Activities" has allegedly taken the
form of lobbying and partisan political conduct supporting pro-
life candidates and opposing others with contrary views.42 Sec-
nevertheless opposed to the Church's position on abortion; Karen DeCrow, a leader of
the feminist movement, former president of NOW, and former and potentially future
candidate for political office; and Susan Sherer, an abortion rights activist. Id. The dis.
trict court granted each individual standing. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
38 Id.
I!d.
885 F.2d at 1023. The Church is composed of approximately 30,000 parishes,
schools and other organizations. All of these organizations are collectively tax-exempt
under the Church's § 501(c)(3) status. Id.
11 Id. at 1022. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
40 885 F.2d at 1022.
41 Id. at 1022 (quoting from Complaint at 22).
42 Cf. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 703-28 (E.D.N.Y.), reu'd on other
grounds sub norm. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (describing in detail some of the
1991]
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tion 501(c)(3) forbids such conduct.43
The complaint alleged that the Church, through its priests
and officials, has endorsed and supported pro-life political candi-
dates and opposed pro-choice candidates. 4 These activities have
taken many forms. Church officials-have, the complaint alleged,
published articles in their bulletins, attacked and endorsed can-
didates from the pulpit, distributed partisan letters to parishio-
ners, and urged members to donate to and sign petitions of
"right to life" committees and candidates. 45 In addition, the
plaintiffs contended that the Church has contributed large sums
of money to organizations that, either directly or indirectly, sup-
port the political candidacies of persons favoring anti-abortion
legislation."
The plaintiffs' claims against the government stemmed from
the contention that the IRS knew about the Church's alleged
political activities and failed to enforce the Code's prohibitions
against such activities.47 They asserted that the IRS, cognizant
of activities beyond the scope of those permitted by section
501(c)(3), either should have revoked the Church's tax-exempt
status or refused to renew its annual exemption. 4" This nonen-
forcement of section 501(c)(3) allegedly injured the plaintiffs.4
By "exempt[ing] the Roman Catholic Church from the strictures
of the law and from the government's enforcement efforts,"50 the
IRS treated the Church more favorably than pro-choice organi-
zations that have obeyed the strictures of section 501(c)(3).51
Church's lobbying and campaigning activities pursuant to this "Pastoral Plan" to have
abortions declared illegal).
"3 See notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
" 885 F.2d at 1022 (quoting from Complaint at 1 26).
45 Id.
4 885 F.2d at 1022 (quoting from Complaint at 1 27).
885 F.2d at 1022.
4" Id.
, 544 F. Supp. at 475. See note 11 and accompanying text supra and note 51 infra.
885 F.2d at 1022 (quoting from Complaint at 1 33).
51 Id. While the plaintiffs did not complain about their own treatment by the IRS,
they nevertheless asserted that the IRS's failure to enforce the Code's prohibitions
against the Church injured them. The individual plaintiffs and tax-exempt organizations
that support a woman's right to have a legal abortion cannot contribute tax-deductible
funds to the campaign of pro-choice candidates. On the other hand, individuals who are
pro-life can funnel donations to pro-life candidates through the Church and thereby re-
ceive a tax benefit. This inconsistency allegedly distorts the political process by impair-
ing the "effectiveness of plaintiffs' political speech and their chances to prevail at the
polls by enhancing the voice of plaintiffs' political adversaries." 544 F. Supp. at 475.
[Vol. 57: 429
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Plaintiffs also expressed general constitutional concerns
about the separation of church and state.5 2 They alleged that the
IRS's selective grant of a virtually unrestricted tax exemption to
the Church constituted a favoring of one religion over another,
thereby violating the Establishment Clause. Essentially, by al-
lowing the Church to use contributions in an unlawful manner
according to section 501(c)(3), and by prohibiting others from
engaging in similar transgressions of the Code, the government
treated the Church more favorably than its ideological
adversaries. 4
The relief the plaintiffs sought included a declaration from
the court that the political activities of the Church and the inac-
tion of the IRS in response to those activities violated section
501(c)(3) and the Establishment Clause of the Constitution."a
They also sought an injunction requiring the government to take
all actions necessary to enforce the Code and the Constitution,
including revocation of the Church's tax-exempt status, collec-
tion of all taxes due, and notification to contributors to the
Church that they could no longer deduct such contributions
from their income tax returns.5 6
C. Prior Proceedings
After the original plaintiffs brought this action, the defend-
ants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the plaintiffs
lacked the requisite standing to bring the suit. 7 The district
Such activity violates the "one person, one vote" principle that governs governmental
attempts to alter or allow the alteration of the political process. Reynolds v. Simms, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (an individual's right to vote is unconstitutionally impaired when its
weight is diluted when compared with votes of other citizens in the same state). See also
Schwarz & Hutton, Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 327:
[T]here can be little doubt that [the IRS'] enforcement of the political cam-
paign limitation in § 501(c)(3) has been uneven. As a practical matter, large
established religious organizations are virtually immune from IRS scrutiny, but
less influential groups on the other side of a controversial issue place their tax
exemptions (and ability to solicit charitable contributions) at great risk if they
become active in political campaigns.
" 544 F. Supp. at 475.
Id. at 476. See notes 108-23 and accompanying text infra.
"See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
15 544 F. Supp. at 476.
8Id.
57 Id. at 471. The defendants also moved to dismiss asserting that the complaint did
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Noting that the plaintiffs would be
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court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in
part.e
The district court, considering the plaintiffs one at a time,
determined that the twenty individual plaintiffs had standing as
voters to contest the alleged infringement of their right to par-
ticipate in the political process on equal terms with all others
free from arbitrary government interference.59 Furthermore, the
court held that three of the nine tax-exempt organizations had
standing to represent their voter members.6 0 In addition, the
court stated that the individual clergy plaintiffs and the
entitled to proceed "'unless it appear[ed] beyond doubt that [they] [could] prove no sat
of facts... which would entitle [them] to relief,'" 544 F. Supp. at 485 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957)), the district court dismissed two counts of the com-
plaint. Id. at 485. The first of these counts had sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
government to enforce the Code against the Church. Id. at 487. Holding that mandamus
is only available to compel ministerial administrative actions and that discretion perme-
ates IRS activities, the court found that mandamus was an inappropriate remedy and
dismissed the count. Id. The second of these counts alleged that the Church had com-
mitted Code violations. Holding that any grievance the plaintiffs had was with the gov-
ernment, this count was dismissed. Id. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text infra.
In addition, the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the court was not
empowered to review the IRS's particular decisions to enforce, or not to enforce, §
501(c)(3). Noting that administrative actions are generally reviewable absent a clear and
convincing contrary legislative intent, and finding that no such intent existed, the court
dismissed this motion. 544 F. Supp. at 488.
'8 See notes 59-66 and accompanying text infra.
544 F. Supp. at 480-82. "Clearly, the government defendants' tax policy is the
source of the distortion in the political process that plaintiffs complain of. An injunction
against that discriminatory policy will restore the proper balance between adversaries in
the abortion debate." Id. at 482. See also notes 175-96 and accompanying text infra.
"0 544 F. Supp. at 482. Voter standing was granted to Nassau-NOW, NWHN, and
ARM. Although none of the organizational plaintiffs could allege injury to themselves as
organizations under the voter standing doctrine (organizations do not vote), the organi-
zations could establish voter standing "'as representatives of those of their members
who have been injured in fact, and thus could have brought suit in their own right.' " Id.
at 480 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). The injury they asserted was
the distortion in the political process that affected their members.
ARM, Nassau-NOW, and NWHN are devoted to promoting and protecting women's
rights. Given the political orientation of these groups, the court determined that they
and their members were sufficiently involved in affecting the legislative process to estab-
lish voter standing. 885 F.2d at'1028; see notes 171-96 and accompanying text infra.
None of the other organizations could allege any political orientation. 544 F. Supp. at
480 n.9.
Arguably, every organization should have been granted standing. Assuming that all
of the organizations' members vote, the political orientation of the organization should
be irrelevant to its ability to represent its voter members. If the members could have
brought suit in their own right, the organizations are entitled to represent them. Worth,
422 U.S. at 511.
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Women's Center for Reproductive Health alleged sufficiently
concrete injuries resulting from the government's tacit endorse-
ment of the Church's position on abortion to merit Establish-
ment Clause standing."' Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of standing was granted in regard to the other plaintiffs.0 2
The United States Catholic Conference and the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops (the Church), asserting that they
had not directly injured any of the plaintiffs, made a motion to
dismiss themselves as defendants in the suit. 3 That motion was
granted. 4 The plaintiffs, by their own admission, had no direct
grievance with the Church. 5 The injuries they claimed arose
from the government's failure to enforce the tax code."0 These
injuries were caused by the government, not the Church.
Although the Church was dismissed as a defendant in the
lawsuit, the district court held that the remaining plaintiffs
could proceed against the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("the government"). After
the plaintiffs initiated discovery, the government filed a motion
to stay discovery.6 7 The Church, no longer a party to the action,
61 544 F. Supp. at 477-80. The other individual plaintiffs could not demonstrate an
injury sufficient to satisfy Establishment Clause standing requirements. The plaintiffs'
concerns about violations of the Establishment Clause did not constitute an injury-in-
fact. Id. at 478. The other organizational plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate an injury
sufficient to confer standing under the Establishment Clause. While their concerns about
transgressions of the First Amendment may have been both justified and sincere, such
concerns did not explain how they had been injured. Id. at 479. See note 27 supra.
62 544 F. Supp. 471. The plaintiffs had also claimed standing under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Id. at 483. The plaintiffs asserted that they had standing based on inju-
ries to rights conferred by the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment. The
plaintiffs asserted that the unequal enforcement of § 501 denied them the right to par-
ticipate equally in the political process. The court dismissed the claim, noting that be-
cause the plaintiffs did not assert that the Code was applied to them in a discriminatory
manner or that they had been denied some tax benefits to which they vere entitled, they
had not been injured.,Id. The Code's alleged misapplication to the Church therefore did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
544 F. Supp. at 487.
6,Id.
65 Id. The government's alleged indifference to the Church's violations of § 501(c)(3)
assertedly gave the Church an unfair advantage in the political battle over the right to
have a legal abortion. The Church, theoretically, played no part in either the mainte-
nance or revocation of its § 501(c)(3) status. The plaintiffs' claims were allowed to pro-
ceed against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the IRS.
Id. at 487.
7 Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 552 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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joined in this motion. 8 The motion was denied but the Church,
through a series of tactical maneuvers, successfully stalled the
discovery process.69
Three years later the government renewed its motion to dis-
miss against the remaining plaintiffs.70 They claimed that the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Allen v. Wright71 -a case
that the defendants asserted closed the door on private suits
challenging government grants of tax exemption-mandated a
dismissal of all of the plaintiffs' claims.72 The district court, de-
termining that Allen did not foreclose the action, reiterated its
previous holding.7 3
Subsequently the plaintiffs served subpoenas on the Church
as a third party. The Church, allegedly concerned about the in-
fringement of its religious freedoms, refused to comply with the
discovery requests.74 After numerous attempts by the court to
" Id. at 366.
0 Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("[The Church] began to engage the court and the plaintiffs in a series of maneuvers
that-given the [Church's] apparent intention of ultimate noncompliance-made a game
of the judicial process."). See also note 74 and accompanying text infra.
70 Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
71 468 U.S. 737 (1984). In Allen the Supreme Court held that the parents of black
school children did not have standing to challenge the tax-exempt status of private
schools. According to Allen, individuals seeking to establish taxpayer standing must
demonstrate that their own tax liabilities have been affected before they can challenge a
determination of the IRS. Id. at 766.
In Allen the parents alleged that IRS grants of tax-exemptions to discriminatory
private schools enabled these schools to offer cheaper tuition and thus induced parents
of white school children to withdraw their children from public schools and place them
in private schools. Id at 744-45. The parents claimed that this activity denied their chil-
dren their constitutional right to attend integrated public schools. Id. See also Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (discriminatory private schools can not qual-
ify for tax-exempt status). The parents were denied standing because they did not
demonstrate a sufficiently personal injury. See note 99 and accompanying text infra. The
Supreme Court held that while "this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most seri-
ous consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circum-
stances to support standing. . . such injury accords a basis for standing only to [plain-
tiffs who were personally injured by the discriminatory conduct]." Allen, 468 U.S. at 755.
Even if the plaintiffs met the personal injury requirement by alleging harm to their op-
portunity to receive an integrated education, the Court held that they failed to satisfy
standing's causation requirements. Id. at 757-59; see note 100 and accompanying text
infra.
7 Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. at 971.
"In applying Allen to the present case it must first be noted that the Court did
not close the door on private suits challenging government grants of tax exemption ...
but used traditional analysis in concluding that the Allen plaintiffs lacked standing." Id.
7' Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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make the discovery process acceptable to both sides proved fu-
tile, the plaintiffs brought a motion to hold the Church in civil
contempt. That motion was granted. 8
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Church asserted that it
was improperly held in contempt.7 e The Church claimed that be-
cause the plaintiffs lacked standing, the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the case and therefore could not
render a valid contempt citation. The Second Circuit held that,
as a nonparty contemnor, the Church itself lacked standing to
challenge the plaintiffs' standing in the main suit.7 8 As a non-
party witness, the Church could only challenge a contempt find-
ing when the district court lacked even colorable jurisdiction.7
Holding that such colorable jurisdiction existed, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that the Church could not challenge the plaintiffs'
standing in the underlying action or raise other issues that
might demonstrate that the district court had erroneously exer-
cised subject matter jurisdiction over the action.80
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a
nonparty witness held in contempt had standing to challenge a
district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 1
The Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit to deter-
mine whether the district court had had subject matter jurisdic-
tion in the underlying action.2 Whether such jurisdiction ex-
isted depends on whether the plaintiffs had standing to
71 Id. at 340.
76 In re United Stated Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987).
7 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 165. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919) (witnesses may only
challenge whether there exists a colorable basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction;
they may not challenge the correctness of the court's exercise of such jurisdiction).
90 Id.
61 United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S.
72 (1988). The Supreme Court held that while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 gives a
district court the power to subpoena witnesses and documents, that court's subpoena
power cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction. Id. at 76. It follows that if a district
court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and the process was not served in an
attempt to determine the presence or lack of that jurisdiction, that process is void. Id.
See also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite3 de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982) (validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court's having juris-
diction over both the subject matter and the parties).
" United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S.
at 79-80.
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challenge the tax-exempt status of the Catholic Church.88 The
Second Circuit, in the opinion that is the focus of this Comment,
held that they did not.84
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standing Defined: Sources and Purposes of the Doctrine
Before it is possible to properly critique the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Catholic Conference, it is necessary to analyze
the somewhat elusive concept of standing, the Article III limita-
tions on that concept, recent changes in the application of
standing, and the Second Circuit's use of the doctrine.
Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to hear
only "cases" or "controversies. ' ' 5 It is here, in Article III, that
standing finds its roots. The standing requirement "seeks to
place fundamental limits on the federal judicial power in our
system of government" by restricting federal judicial action to
only those cases that are properly before the courts.8 Standing
is therefore an indispensable element of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. 7 Although simple in theory, the determination of
,3 Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1023.
I Id. at 1031. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not meet the require-
ments necessary to confer standing under Article III. Therefore, the district court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction and could not render a valid contempt citation. The
Second Circuit vacated the contempt citation and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.
885 F.2d at 1031.
85 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. "The judicial Power [of the federal courts] shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... [and] to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party. . . ." Id.
This limitation ensures, inter alia, that the federal courts do not issue advisory opin-
ions that would, in essence, exceed the scope of their power under Article III and violate
the constitutional principle of separation of powers. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750 (1984); P. BATOR, D. MELTER, P. ISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 66-67 (3d ed. 1988) ("the lines of separation
drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the government... [pro-
vent] our extrajudicially deciding the [advisory] questions alluded to") (quoting letter
from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices to President George Washington
of Aug. 8, 1793).
8e Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
87 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1970) (while Congress
may not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to render advisory opinions, it may create
by statute legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing); see also Catholic Confer-
ence, 885 F.2d at 1023 ("when a plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit, a court has no
subject matter jurisdiction over the case").
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whether standing exists has proven to be possibly the most diffi-
cult component of the case or controversy analysis 58
The United States Supreme Court has described standing
as "a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy .... "I'll Justice
Scalia, attempting to shed light on a seemingly clear definition
that has nevertheless plagued the Court and the public with in-
consistent rulings on the issue,90 described standing as follows:
"[Standing] is an answer to the very first question that is some-
times rudely asked when one person complains of another's ac-
tions: 'What's it to you?' ,,91 Standing is thus a threshold in-
quiry, concerned primarily with whether a litigant's stake in a
suit is sufficient to merit judicial consideration and redress of
the problem.9 2 It represents just one of the many barriers plain-
tiffs must overcome if they are to have their case heard in fed-
eral court.9 3
In recent years the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify
the rules governing the application of the standing doctrine in
"Standing has been called one of 'the most amorphous (concepts) in the entire
domain of public law."' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting from Hearings
on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund)); see also Nichol, Injury
and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALin. L REv. 1915 (1986) ("after almost two
hundred years, the judiciary has yet to outline successfully the parameters of a constitu-
tional 'case' [or controversy]"); Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law,
88 COLUM. L REv. 1432, 1433-34 (1988) (the Supreme Court's current standing approach
results in decisions denying standing when it should be granted and granting standing
when it should be denied).
Il Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) ("whether a party has a suffi-
cient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy is what has traditionally been referred
to as the question of standing to sue").
Justiciablility is itself an unclear concept. Essentially, justiciability expresses the ju-
risdictional limitations imposed by the case or controversy requirement of Article II.
The concept is best defined by noting the circumstances in which federal courts have
held that a certain question is not justiciable. In general, a controversy is not justiciable
when the parties seek adjudication of a political question, when the parties desire an
advisory opinion, when the question presented is moot, or when the parties lack standing
to maintain the action. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
90 See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
91 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881, 882 (1983).
9 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968) (standing does not involve a determina-
tion of whether the substantive issues in a case are suitable for judicial resolution).
93 See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
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the federal courts. 4 The essence of a standing inquiry, according
to the Court, "is whether the parties seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction have 'alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
tional questions.' "5 The Court, in applying this statement, has
settled on a two-tiered method for determining standing that
consists of a coinstitutional test and a prudential test.e The two
tiers, not always clearly separable, have led to the evolution of a
doctrine of standing that can best be described as "a blend of
constitutional requirements and prudential considerations."97
To satisfy the constitutional test, a test deriving from the
Article III limitation on judicial power, the litigant must demon-
strate an injury-in-fact.98 Demonstrating an injury-in-fact entails
a three-pronged analysis. First, plaintiffs must show that they
have suffered an injury that is both concrete and individual in
nature. 9 Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the de-
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) ("There is no question that an
association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself
and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy. Even
in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the represen-
tative of its members."); Flast, 392 U.S. at 83 (taxpayer standing exists to challenge
congressional expenditures alleged to be violative of the Establishment Clause); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voters have standing to contest the alleged infringement of
their right to participate in the plitical arena on equal terms with others, free from
arbitrary government interference).
95 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
So See Coyle, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative Agency Ac-
tions, 76 CALiF. L. REv. 1061 (1988) (describing the two components of the Court's stand.
ing analysis).
97 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255
(1953) ("[prudential rules are] not always clearly distinguished from the constitutional
limitation[s]").
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-72.
" See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472
(plaintiff must show actual or threatened injury fairly traceable to challenged action and
redressable by a favorable decision); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38 (1976) (injury must be redressable by a favorable decision of the court).
Although the Supreme Court has not conclusively defined injury, it is clear that the
injury must be tangible; an abstract injury, without some direct impact on a plaintiff, is
not sufficient. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86 (violation of Establishment
Clause by government giving surplus land to a religious college did not injure plaintiffs);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (plaintiff's claim to compel Secretary of
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fendant's conduct.10 This is essentially a causation requirement.
Finally, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "the exercise of the
Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries."'1*
As mentioned above, prudential concerns coexist with the
constitutional component of standing. These concerns act as dis-
cretionary limitations, furthering the Article Ill policies that
limit the exercise of judicial power.10 2 The prudential concerns
forbid the litigant from raising the rights of another, bar adjudi-
cation of "generalized grievances more appropriately addressed
in the representative branches," and require that the plaintiff's
complaint fall within the "zone of interest" covered by the stat-
ute in question. 0 3 These prudential limitations are imposed in
order to prevent the erosion of the public confidence upon which
the judiciary's power depends,10' and in recognition of the need
the Treasury to publish CIA receipts and expenditures was generalized grievance which
did not confer standing to bring action in federal court); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (concrete injury is indispensable element of stand-
ing); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (while it is possible that injury for
standing purposes may be aesthetic in nature, party must still demonstrate personal
injury).
Although an individual, concrete injury is necessary to confer standing, the Court
has in the past recognized the most insubstantial of injuries as satisfying the constitu-
tional requirement. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (a five dollar
fine sufficient to constitute an injury); Harper v. Virgina Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (poll tax of $1.50 is an injury under the constitutional analysis).
The injury requirement serves to distinguish someone with a personal stake in the
outcome of a trial, even though that stake might be exceedingly small, from a person
with a mere interest in the problem. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973).
100 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976) (plaintiff organization lacked
standing because it did not demonstrate that change in IRS regulation caused hospital to
discontinue treatment of the poor); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiffs who
claimed to have been injured by zoning rules lacked standing because they were unable
to show that they would have been able to purchase or lease the property had the zoning
rule not existed).
101 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 74 (citizens living near proposed nuclear power site had
standing to maintain action challenging the constitutionality of the Price Anderson Act
which imposed insurance liability cap on damages for nuclear accidents at federally li-
censed private nuclear power plants).
102 See L. TRsa, A macAN CONSTrrtMoNAL LAW §3-19, at 135 (2d ed. 1988) (The
prudential concerns address "whether a litigant before a federal court who has satisfied
the minimum standing requirements of article HI should be allowed to raise particular
legal claims in the course of litigation.").
103 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (constant head-to-head confrontations between the legislature and the judiciary
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to avoid power struggles with the other branches of govern-
ment.10 5 However, when the constitutional concerns have been
satisfied, the Court has rarely denied standing on prudential
grounds.108
B. Application
Standing in Catholic Conference presents a number of diffi-
cult issues. In order to properly assess the Second Circuit's deci-
sion it will be necessary to approach standing, as did the Second
Circuit, in a piecemeal manner, analyzing the individual plain-
tiffs in an attempt to determine whether they satisfied the re-
quirements set forth in the preceding section. 10 7
1. Establishment Clause Standing
The first standing theory addressed by the Second Circuit
was "establishment clause standing."' 08 The plaintiffs that
sought standing under this theory were the religiously affiliated
organizations and the members of the clergy that participated in
the action. 09 The Second Circuit, notwithstanding the plaintiffs'
will erode the public confidence "vitally critical to the latter").
'" Richardson, 418 U.S. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring) (repeated confrontations be-
tween the judiciary and the other branches of government would interfere with the
proper functioning of the government).
108 See Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) ("the
basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are generally
satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met"); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
255-59 (1953) (although prudential concerns dictate that one may not ordinarily claim
standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party, this policy is outweighed
by the need to guarantee injured litigants the right to assert their grievances before a
court).
107 Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1020.
108 Id. at 1024-27. The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test to determine
Establishment Clause violations. A challenged government action withstands an Estab-
lishment Clause attack "if it has a secular legislative purpose, if its principal or primary
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and if it is does not foster an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion." Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980). Accord Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971). See also notes 111-23 and accompanying text infra.
108 885 F.2d at 1024-27. The Second Circuit's Establishment Clause standing analy-
sis was limited to clergy plaintiffs and the religiously affiliated Women's Center for Re-
productive Health because the southern district, in the initial proceeding, held that none
of the other individual or organizational plaintiffs alleged sufficiently personal injuries to
meet standing requirements. See Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 544 F. Supp. at
477-80. The other three organizations had no religious aims and thus could not show an
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religious status, held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate suf-
ficiently personal injuries to satisfy constitutional standing re-
quirements." 0 The forthcoming analysis will show that that de-
cision was correct.
The clergy plaintiffs sought standing under the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment."' The clause provides in
relevant part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion ... ."I" Claiming that the IRS's refusal
to enforce the section 501(c)(3) prohibitions on lobbying and
campaigning constituted government favoritism to the Church,
the plaintiffs alleged that:
The failure of the government defendants to apply the [Internal Reve-
nue] Code equally to the ... Church is in effect a subsidy of the
Church's efforts to further its religious aims in the political sphere, a
subsidy not granted to law-abiding... plaintiffs, who hold contrary
religious beliefs. This constitutes an unconstitutional establishment of
religion." 3
Essentially, the clergy plaintiffs alleged that the government's
failure to compel the Church to conform to section 501(c)(3)'s
guidelines allowed the Church to engage in activities that, in ef-
fect, advanced the goals of the Church at the expense of those of
the plaintiffs.
The clergy involved in this action provide spiritual leader-
ship and care for their congregations, including counsel on the
issue of abortion." 4 By allowing the Church to lobby and cam-
paign for legislation and candidates dedicated to outlawing abor-
tion, the government tacitly fostered the mission of the
Church." 5 This tacit favoritism of one orthodoxy over another
injury to themselves arising out of the alleged Establishment Clause violations. 885 F.2d
at 1024-27. Their involvement in the abortion controversy described the interest that
brought them to court, but not the injury they had suffered. Id.
210 885 F.2d at 1024-27.
, Id. at 1024.
U.S. CONST. amend. L
113 885 F.2d at 1024 (quoting from Complaint at T 43).
114 A number of the clergy plaintiffs stated in their affidavits that they consider the
availability of abortion a compelling and necessary right. See 544 F. Supp at 479 n.7
("To force a woman to bring an unwanted fetus into the world is a serious abridgment of
the Bible .... ') (quoting from Affidavit of Rabbi Israel Margolies at T 3); id. ("part of
Episcopalian doctrine [is] that women and families should be free to terminate [certain)
pregnancies") (quoting from Affidavit of Rev. Beatrice Blair at It 5-6).
I'l 544 F. Supp. at 480.
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translated into a comparative disadvantage for the Church's ide-
ological adversaries.11
Basically, the Church was permitted to use moneys obtained
through its section 501 exemption to fund organizations and po-
litical machinery that endorsed the Church's religious aims.
Therefore, the government, the source of this exemption, ille-
gally subsidized groups and individuals that sought to further
the goals of the Church. The religiously affiliated organizational
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference were not afforded a similarly
blind eye. As a result, the religious aims of the plaintiffs did not
receive the political support the Church obtained through its
partisan contributions. In the inherently competitive political
arena such an advantage is invaluable.
The injury thus asserted by the plaintiffs was to their spiri-
tual beliefs. The government, through the inaction of the IRS,
assisted the Church in achieving its ideals. Although this assis-
tance was indirectly provided through a tax "subsidy," the gov-
ernment need not expressly coerce individuals to conform to a
particular ideology to injure the spiritual values protected by the
Establishment Clause. 11 7 Whether such injuries are sufficient to
constitute an injury for Article III standing purposes is a ques-
tion that must begin with an analysis of spiritual injuries in
general.
As a general proposition, an injury deriving from a violation
of the Establishment Clause can be spiritual in nature.1 " How-
116 Id. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
117 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962):
The Establishment Clause ... does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which es-
tablish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonob-
serving individuals or not.... [W]hen the power, prestige and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing offi-
cially approved religion is plain.
118 See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486-87 n.22 (although plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that Establishment Clause violation injured them, injury can be spiritual in na-
ture, "requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment
Clause ... do not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed") (quot-
ing Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963)). See also United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-88 (1973) (standing is not confined to those who could show
economic harm); Association of Data Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970) ("[a] person or family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values suffi-
cient to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause").
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ever, offense to one's sense of separatist principles is not a suffi-
cient injury to constitute standing to bring suit for an alleged
Establishment Clause violation.1 " A plaintiff seeking to chal-
lenge a practice of government must allege a particular injury
that directly affects that individual or the group he or she repre-
sents.120 It is in this respect that the instant plaintiffs failed.
The clergy plaintiffs were not personally injured by the gov-
ernment's actions. They did not allege that they were mistreated
by the IRS; the IRS had never threatened their tax status. 12 1
Therefore, although the plaintiffs asserted that the activities of
the IRS comparatively stifled their religious aims, they did not
allege any specific, personal injury. The plaintiffs were unable to
point to any governmental conduct that had directly affected
their own ministries or organizations. They simply sought to
force the IRS to enforce the section 501(c)(3) prohibitions they
were obligated to comply with. The clergy plaintiffs' particular
devotion to the pro-choice position does not explain how they
were damaged; it only serves to explain why they chose to chal-
lenge the renewal of the Church's section 501(c)(3) status.122 A
motivation to bring suit, however sincere, is not a substitute for
standing's injury-in-fact requirement..123
"I Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 ("[Plaintiff's] claim that the Government has vio-
lated the Establishment Clause does not provide a special license to roam the country in
search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal court.").
See also Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952) (the esence of standing
"is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite ... interest that is, or
is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct").
11 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9 (plaintiffs alleging injury must have been "directly
affected by the ... practices against which their complaints are directed").
1I Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1026.
1'2 "[S]tanding is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fer-
vor of his advocacy." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486.
12l Id. Although a particularized injury standard lends a degree of consistency to the
standing doctrine, historical support for the requirement is lacking. The idea that a
plaintiff must suffer some injury before a federal court can provide relief, although al.
ready in wide use, was articulated in Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (injury-in-fact must be shown). An analysis of the lan-
guage of Article I, however, does not support the conclusion that the violation of a
constitutionally recognized right creates no injury. See Berger, Standing to Sue in Pub-
lic Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YArn L.J. 816, 818 (1969) ("Unlike
'case or controversy,' which can summon the express terms of Article m, 'standing' is not
mentioned in the Constitution or the records of the several conventions. It is a judicial
construct pure and simple which, in its present sophisticated form, is of relatively recent
origin."); Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge,
61 N.C.L. Rnv. 798, 821 (1983) ("Even if an injury component could be historically sus-
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2. Taxpayer Standing
The second standing theory considered by the Second Cir-
cuit was a theory typically referred to as "taxpayer standing.
1 24
Taxpayer standing, a doctrine the Supreme Court has developed
in its continuing effort to clarify standing requirements, allows
litigants to challenge the constitutionality of congressional ex-
penditures made under the taxing and spending authority. 12
This requirement-that a plaintiff seeking standing as a tax-
payer must challenge the taxing and spending power-ensures
that a litigant can demonstrate a sufficient personal stake in the
controversy to satisfy the first prong of the constitutional stand-
ing analysis. 126 Essentially, under certain limited circumstances,
a plaintiff's status as a taxpayer supplies the personal injury es-
sential to standing. Plaintiffs in the instant case asserted that, as
taxpayers, they had standing to challenge the IRS's refusal to
revoke the Catholic Church's tax-exempt status.127 However, the
crux of this challenge did not concern an exercise of the congres-
sional taxing and spending power. Rather, what the plaintiffs
tained, nothing in the case or controversy requirement supports a particularized injury
standard.") (emphasis in original). As well supported as these arguments may be, the
injury-in-fact requirement nevertheless remains the cornerstone of the Court's constitu-
tional standing component.
An additional problem concerning Establishment Clause standing is that granting
standing to the clergy simply because they are clergy could encourage plaintiff shopping.
A group or individual seeking to challenge a violation of the Establishment Clause could
circumvent constitutional standing requirements by joining a member of the clergy in
the lawsuit. The Second Circuit did not address this.
124 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (a federal taxpayer has standing to
challenge federal aid to religious schools alleged to violate the First Amendment's Estab.
lishment Clause). The decision that granted taxpayers standing to challenge federal ex-
penditures violative of the Establishment Clause reversed a longstanding rule that tax-
payers do not have standing to contest how the federal government spends tax revenue.
See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
125 Flast, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
228 Id. at 102-03.
12 885 F.2d 1020, 1027-28. Subsequent to the filing of the instant complaint, the
Supreme Court decided Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Because some commentators have con-
cluded that Valley Forge has eliminated taxpayer standing, the plaintiffs in Catholic
Conference abandoned this standing theory in the district court. See Note, Analyzing
Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General Standing Principles: The Road Not Taken, 63
B.U.L. REv. 717 (1983). Following the Court's decision in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988), holding that taxpayers bad standing to challenge the executive branch's ad.
ministration of a taxing and spending statute, the plaintiffs renewed their taxpayer
standing arguments. See also notes 163-70 and accompanying text infra.
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challenged was the enforcement of an exercise of that power.
The Second Circuit held that because the plaintiffs' challenge
did not directly concern an exercise of Congress's taxing and
spending power, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate any nexus
between their status as taxpayers and the IRS's refusal to en-
force section 501(c)(3). 125 Absent such a nexus, the plaintiffs did
not allege the personal injury upon which standing depends. An
analysis of several recent decisions by the Supreme Court will
demonstrate that the Second Circuit's review of taxpayer stand-
ing and its subsequent refusal to grant plaintiffs such standing
were correct.
In order to establish taxpayer standing, plaintiffs must sat-
isfy a two-pronged test.129 First, plaintiffs must establish a con-
nection between their status as taxpayers and the legislation at-
tacked. 3 ' Therefore, taxpayers would have standing only to
challenge the constitutionality of "exercises of the congressional
... taxing and spending power clause of Art. I, §8" and conse-
quently would lack standing to challenge the expenditure of
funds incidental to a regulatory scheme. 3' A challenge that does
not attack an exercise of the taxing and spending power lacks
the necessary nexus between an individual's status as a taxpayer
and the claim sought to be adjudicated. 3 2 Under the second
prong, the taxpayer-plaintiff must show that the challenged en-
128 885 F.2d at 1027-28.
129 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. "When both nexuses are established, the litigant vill have
shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will be a proper and
appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction." Id. at 103.
In Flast, a group of federal taxpayers brought suit to enjoin the expenditure of fed-
eral funds being used to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for paro-
chial schools. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, held that
federal taxpayers had standing to sue to challenge such expenditures on the ground that
they violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id.
120 Id. at 102.
131 Id. Nearly every measure enacted in the form of a tax will have at least a par-
tia]ly incidental regulatory effect. For example, an excise tax on alcohol will, to a certain
degree, encourage people to drink less. If the regulatory impact of the tax could have
been achieved by the use of another enumerated power (e.g., the Commerce Clause), the
fact that the tax has a regulatory impact is not of constitutional significance. But see
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (Congress's enactment of the Child
Labor Tax Law of 1919, a law designed to prohibit the shipment of products of child
labor in interstate commerce, was invalidated because the Court found that the purpose
of the tax was primarily regulatory.). Today, this tax law would probably be upheld
under the Commerce Clause.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. See note 130 supra.
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actment exceeds specific constitutional limitations on the con-
gressional taxing and spending power, such as those limitations
imposed by the First Amendment.1 33
Although taxpayer standing is a potentially powerful tool
for injured taxpayers, its actual significance has never been fully
realized. As the Second Circuit noted in its opinion, the Court's
strict application in three subsequent cases of what has been la-
beled the Flast test has essentially eliminated the doctrine of
taxpayer standing. .34
United States v. Richardson3 5 was the first of these cases.
In Richardson the plaintiff, a federal taxpayer, alleged that the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,136 a statute that per-
mitted the nondisclosure of the CIA's expenditures, violated the
Accounts Clause of the Constitution.137 The plaintiff asserted
that without access to "detailed information on CIA expendi-
tures-and hence its activities-he [could not] intelligently fol-
low the actions of Congress or the Executive, nor [could] he
properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate in
voting for candidates seeking national office."138 Regardless of
13 Id. at 102-03. It is not sufficient that the taxpayer-plaintiff simply allege that the
challenged enactment is beyond the powers delegated to congress in Article I, § 8. The
plaintiffs must find a constitutional restriction directed specifically at an exercise of the
taxing and spending power. The Flast Court distinguished Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), on this basis. Id. at 104-05. See note 124 supra. The plaintiff in Froth-
ingham alleged that Congress caused an increase in her taxes by infringing the states'
Tenth Amendment rights. What the plaintiff failed to allege was any positive right that
protected her from the increased tax liability. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488. Therefore,
she failed to satisfy the second prong of the Flast test and was denied standing. Flast,
392 U.S. at 104-05. The Supreme Court also held that Frothingham represented only a
prudential bar to taxpayer suits. Flast, 392 U.S. at 92-93 (the holding in Frothingham
"rests on something less than a constitutional foundation"). Id. at 93.
134 885 F.2d at 1027. See notes 135-61 and accompanying text infra. See also Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Note, Analyzing Taxpayer
Standing, supra note 127.
135 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
ISO 50 U.S.C. § 403j (1988) (concerning the accounting and reporting procedures and
requirements for the CIA).
137 The Accounts Clause provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Trea-
sury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
'" 418 U.S. at 176. Although the plaintiff's claim did not allege any pecuniary In-
jury, for taxpayer standing purposes, an injury "'need not always be the appropriation
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the plaintiff's arguably genuine interest in the use of his taxes,
the Court held that he did not satisfy the Flast double-nexus
test. First, the plaintiff had challenged a statute regulating
agency action, not an exercise of Congress's taxing and spending
power.1"9 In addition, he had not, as the second prong of Flast
mandates, alleged that the funds were spent "in violation of a
'specific constitutional limitation [on] ... the taxing and spend-
ing power.'11o
This application of the Flast test was suspect. Flast v. Co-
hen held that a taxpayer had standing to challenge expenditures
of federal taxes that served to finance the establishment of a re-
ligion contrary to the Establishment Clause. 41 In more general
terms, Flast recognized standing of a taxpayer "to challenge ap-
propriations made in the face of a constitutional prohibition.142
Given the Richardson Court's reliance on the above assessment
of Flast, it is difficult to ascertain, in light of the Accounts
Clause, how the Court failed to address the gap in reasoning
that pervades its opinion. Although the plaintiff in Richardson
did not satisfy the letter of either prong of the Flast test, the
Accounts Clause was intended to give taxpayers the right to
know "the way public funds are expended."'' 43 Furthermore,
even though the CIA is an agency of the executive branch, it is
funded by Congress. Thus, the money the CIA spent derived
from Congress's spending power. If, as Flast stated, a taxpayer
can have a personal stake in the expenditures of government, it
is difficult to see how that right can be enforced if an organiza-
tion such as the CIA is not required to disclose those
expenditures."4
and spending of Itaxpayer's] money for an invalid purpose. The personal stake may
come from an injury in fact even if it is not directly economic in nature." 418 U.S. at
176 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970)).
119 418 U.S. at 175.
140 Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 104).
1,1 Flast, 392 U.S. at 83.
1,2 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 198. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (Federal taxpayers may
have standing to "challenge the constitutionality of a federal spending proram... [if]
they can demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to
satisfy Article III requirements.").
14s Richardson, 418 U.S. at 200 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144 As the Third Circuit noted, given that Flast recognized the standing of a tax-
payer to challenge unconstitutional appropriations, "how can a taxpayer make that chal-
lenge unless he knows how the money is being spent?" Richardson v. United States, 465
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Richardson's reliance on the letter of Flast demonstrates
that a failure to come within that letter is fatal to a plaintiff
seeking standing in federal court. It ignores what is, arguably,
the purpose of taxpayer standing: to allow federal taxpayers to
challenge how their taxes are being spent. 4"
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 14 was
a companion case to Richardson. The plaintiffs in Schlesinger
challenged the membership of Congressmen in the armed forces
reserves, alleging that such membership violated the Incompati-
bility Clause. 147 The Court, without explanation, 148 affirmed the
district court's denial of taxpayer standing on the ground that
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Flast nexus test.140
The district court, applying the letter of Flast, had held
that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the nexus test. °0 The plain-
tiffs did not challenge an exercise of the congressional taxing
and spending power but rather "the action of the Executive
Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their
Reserve status."'15'
Arguably, the Court's cursory dismissal of the plaintiffs'
taxpayer standing claims was mistaken. The plaintiffs' com-
plaint alleged that Congressmen holding positions in the
reserves were "subject to the possibility of undue influence by
the Executive Branch," the governmental branch in charge of
the armed forces. 52 Such undue influence could result in addi-
tional expenditures in which the plaintiffs would have a specific
interest as taxpayers. Assuming that the plaintiffs in Schlesinger
F.2d 844, 853 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
14 Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have never overruled Flast, they
have steadfastly refused to allow any broadening whatsoever of the Flast exception to
the general rule prohibiting taxpayer standing. Since Flast no case other than Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), has been held to fit within Flast's narrow exception. See
note 164-70 and accompanying text infra.
148 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
1'47 The Incompatibility Clause states, in relevant part, that "no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continu.
ance in Office." U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2.
146 See text accompanying note 151 infra for the language of the district court.
", Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
'8o Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd sub noma. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
18 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
152 Id. at 212.
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were injured as taxpayers, and assuming that the Incompatibil-
ity Clause created a personally enforceable right,5 3 then the pol-
icies underlying Flast-allowing a taxpayer standing to chal-
lenge the manner in which his or her taxes were spent-seem to
argue for a grant of standing, despite the language of Flast.
The most striking of these three cases is Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc.154 Valley Forge is particularly important
to the present analysis because, like Catholic Conference, Valley
Forge concerned an alleged violation of the Establishment
Clause. In Valley Forge a group of plaintiffs attempted to chal-
lenge the transfer of a valuable parcel of government property to
a religious college.' 5 Subsequent to the transfer, Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., a citizens
group, brought suit alleging that the conveyance violated the Es-
tablishment Clause. The United States Supreme Court, in a five-
to-four decision,15 held that the plaintiffs lacked taxpayer
standing. 57 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist deter-
mined that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first prong of the
Flast test for two reasons. 58 As mentioned above, the first prong
of the Flast test mandates that plaintiffs seeking standing as
taxpayers must challenge an exercise of the congressional taxing
and spending power founded in Article I, section 8. The plain-
tiffs in Valley Forge challenged the decision of an executive
agency to transfer a parcel of federal property, not an exercise of
congressional spending power. 59 Second, the Court stated that
the statute that authorized the conveyance of the land was en-
acted under the Property Clause of Article IV, not the Taxing
153 Justice Douglas, in his dissent, developed support for the contention that the
Incompatibility Clause created a personally enforceable right. 418 U.S. at 238.40 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting). Arguably, such a right is similar to the limitations on Congre 's
power that Flast held were inherent in the First Amendment.
154 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
151 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) transferred the land
in 1976 pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Service3 Act. 40 U.S.C. §§
471-535 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989). Valley Forge Christian College, the recipient of the par-
cel, was created "to offer systematic training on the collegiate level to men and women
for Christian service as either ministers or laymen." 454 U.S. at 468.
11 Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackrmun. 454 Us.
at 490. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent. Id. at 513.
157 Id. at 490.
258 Id. at 479-80.
159 Id. at 479.
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and Spending Clause of Article I.160
The Supreme Court's application of the Flast test in the
three aforementioned cases can best be described as limited.
The literal, formalistic manner in which the Court has employed
the double-nexus test has, in effect, eliminated taxpayer stand-
ing.I61 The letter, and not the spirit, of Flast has governed all
subsequent attempts to establish taxpayer standing. It is this
approach that no doubt motivated the plaintiffs in Catholic
Conference to abandon the taxpayer standing doctrine in the
district court.26
2
A recent decision by the Supreme Court convinced the
plaintiffs, albeit mistakenly, to renew these arguments. 163 In
Bowen v. Kendrick 4 the plaintiffs-taxpayers challenged the ap-
plication of the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), a statute
that authorized federal grants to public or private organizations
or agencies for services and research in the area of prenatal ado-
lescent sexual relations and pregnancy.6 5 Although the defend-
ants in Bowen alleged that the federal taxpayers lacked standing
140 Id. at 480.
'61 "Literal application of the. .. Court's first distinction virtually overrules Flast,
because the Flast plaintiffs attacked actions of the same executive department chal-
lenged in [Valley Forge]." Note, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing, supra note 129, at 741;
see also Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAiw. L. R.v. 52, 54 (1965).
As Justice Brennan argued in his dissent in Valley Forge, "The opinion of the Court
is a stark example of this unfortunate trend of resolving cases at the 'threshold' while
obscuring the nature of the underlying rights and interests at stake.... (Niot one word
is said about the Establishment Clause right that the plaintiff seeks to enforce." 454
U.S. at 490-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan's point,
rejected by the majority, was that the protections provided by the Establishment Clause
cannot be fully realized unless there is easy, unrestricted access to the federal courts to
challenge expenditures that might violate the clause. Standing, according to Justice
Brennan, should not focus on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court, but rather on the issue he seeks to have adjudicated. 454 U.S. at 484.
If one accepts Justice Brennan's view, taxpayer standing, as the Court has construed
it, is overly narrow. Arguably, a member of society should not have to demonstrate that
he pays taxes to seek judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause. The Establish-
ment Clause should protect all members of society from excessive entanglement of
church and state, not just taxpayers.
161 Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1027.
18 Plaintiffs renewed their taxpayer standing arguments before the Second Circuit
in the appeal that is the subject of this Comment. Id. See notes 164-73 and accompany.
ing text infra.
1 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
105 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1988).
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because the expenditures were made by the executive branch
and not by Congress, 6  the Court, noting the challenge's similar-
ity to Flast, rejected this argument.167 The AFLA, according to
the Supreme Court,
is at heart a program of disbursement of funds pursuant to Congress'
taxing and spending powers, and appellees' claims call into question
how the funds authorized by Congress are being disbursed pursuant
to AFLA's statutory mandate. In this case there is thus a sufficient
nexus between the taxpayer's standing as a taxpayer and the congres-
sional exercise of taxing and spending, notwithstanding the role the
Secretary plays in administering the statute.108
In so holding, the Supreme Court clarified, but did not expand,
the Flast test: taxpayers have standing to challenge the execu-
tive branch's administration of a taxing and spending statute.69
The fact that the executive branch, and not the Congress, over-
saw expenditures made pursuant to the statute was irrelevant.
Plaintiffs challenged the taxing and spending power of Congress;
the complaint need not be directed exclusively at Congress. 70
As powerful as Bowen may be in future taxpayer suits, it
did not, as the Second Circuit stated, enhance the instant plain-
tiffs' taxpayer standing claims.1 71 In Bowen Congress controlled
the disbursement of the AFLA funds. The executive branch ac-
ted simply as an intermediary; its sole function was to direct the
expenditure of the capital pursuant to AFLA's statutory man-
date. Therefore, as the Second Circuit noted, the challenge in
Bowen was entirely harmonious with Flast: the plaintiffs chal-
lenged an exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power: the
executive branch merely carried out that power.
The litigants in Catholic Conference, on the other hand, did
not challenge Congress's exercise of its taxing and spending
powers as embodied in section 501(c)(3).12 The argument cen-
116 The plaintiffs in Flast attacked actions of an executive department. The Flast
plaintiffs pleaded in the alternative that the defendant HEW's actions were beyond the
scope of the challenged Act, or, if HEW's actions were deemed to be within the authority
and intent of the Act, that the Act was unconstitutional because it amounted to an eas-
tablishment of religion. Flast, 392 U.S. at 87.
187 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 618.
188 Id. at 619-20.
,19 Id. at 620; Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1027.
170 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620.
L' Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028.
172 Id.
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tered instead on the contention that the IRS, by allegedly disre-
garding the Church's violations of section 501(c)(3), had not en-
forced the Internal Revenue Code.173 This is incongruous with
Flast. Flast mandates that a litigant seeking standing as a tax-
payer must challenge an exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power. The instant plaintiffs did not. Nowhere did the
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference challenge the constitutionality
of section 501(c)(3) of the Code. They did not allege that the
Code favored the Church, but rather that the executive branch
had not enforced the Code. This is distinguishable from Bowen.
In Bowen the plaintiffs attacked the AFLA, an exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power, notwithstanding the
executive branch's administration of that statute.
The plaintiffs in Catholic Conference did not attack section
501(c)(3). They challenged instead the enforcement of that sec-
tion. The claim thus lacked any nexus whatsoever between the
taxpayers' status as taxpayers and the congressional exercise of
the taxing and spending power.174 This nexus, according to
Flast, supplies the injury that Article III requires. Therefore, ab-
sent the necessary nexus, the personal stake that is essential to
standing was lacking. The plaintiffs did not sufficiently attack
the constitutionality of the exercise of Congress's taxing and
spending power, nor did they allege that section 501(c)(3) ex-
ceeded specific constitutional limitations on that power. Thus,
neither prong of the Flast test was met and the Second Circuit
properly denied the plaintiffs standing as taxpayers.
3. Voter Standing
The third standing theory evaluated by the Second Circuit
was a doctrine known as "voter standing."' 75 The Supreme
Court first articulated the concept of voter standing in Baker v.
Carr.76 In Baker the Court conferred what it termed "voter
standing" on a group of Tennessee citizens that sought to chal-
lenge the state's apportionment scheme. 77 The injury the plain-
178 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17 Id. at 207. The Baker plaintiffs instituted an action seeking: 1) a declaration that
the Tennessee Apportionment Act of 1901 was unconstitutional; and 2) an injunction
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tiffs asserted was that the classification arrangement disfavored
the voters in the counties in which they resided, "placing them
in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-&-vis
voters in irrationally favored counties. 178 Essentially, the wrong
that the plaintiffs wanted to vindicate was the dilution of their
vote relative to the vote of other citizens of the same state . 7
The Baker Court held that voters disadvantaged by Tennessee's
apportionment plan had standing to challenge that plan.8 0 Ac-
cording to the Court the dilution of the plaintiffs' voting power,
the "gross disproportion of representation" they were granted,
provided the direct, cognizable injury necessary to a standing
claim.1 l
The Second Circuit adopted an extremely narrow view of
Baker in Catholic Conference. The court held that the instant
plaintiffs' asserted basis for standing had nothing to do with vot-
ing.""2 Given that the "voter" plaintiffs in Catholic Conference
alleged that the IRS's refusal to revoke the Catholic Church's
tax-exempt status injured them by impairing and diminishing
their right to vote,8 3 a right that Baker specifically stated voters
had standing to enforce, it is difficult to justify the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning.18 4 An analysis of this reasoning will demon-
restraining the defendants from conducting any further elections under the act. Id. at
195. They alleged that the act violated the Fourteenth Amendment in its disregard of
the standard of apportionment prescribed by the state's constitution resulting in a gro:3
disproportion of representation to voting population. Baker, 369 U.S. 188.
178 Id. at 207-08.
179 See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 n.4 (1984); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (construing Baker). See also Shakmen v. Democratic Org. of Cook Cty.,
435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970) (two voters had standing to challenge county's patronage
system because of alleged injury to plaintiffs' "equal chance and... equal voice" in the
electoral process); Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974) (standing conferred on a nonprofit corporation that challenged an IRS revenue
ruling concerning campaign gifts because the alleged diminution of one's vote and the
dilution of the ability to affect the electoral process "are judicially recognized wrongs and
are thus sufficient" to confer standing); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'I Comm., 333
F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971) (allegations that several national committee of political par-
ties circumvented a statute placing limits on individual campaign contributions, thereby
diluting the plaintiffs' voice in the voting process, were sufficient to constitute standing
for the plaintiff corporation).
11o Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
Is Id. at 204-08.
18 Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028.
183 Id.
18 The Second Circuit premised its decision to deny the plaintiffs voter standing on
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). In Davis the Supreme Court conferred standing
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strate that the court's restrictive view of Baker's impact and the
court's subsequent denial of voter standing were incorrect.
Baker and its progeny all concerned allegations that, by im-
permissibly diluting one group's voting strength relative to that
of another group, arbitrary government action hinders one or-
ganization's ability to affect the political process in relation to
the ability of a more favored group.185 According to Baker, a
"citizen's right to vote free of arbitrary impairment ... has been
judicially recognized as a right secured by the constitution, when
such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally'8 . .. or
by a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts 87
. . . or by a stuffing of the ballot box."' While these rights and
the right protected by Baker specifically concerned voters and
voting legislation, arguably, the interests the Baker Court sought
to protect were much broader.
Beyond the words the Court employed, Baker recognized
that individuals have standing to challenge government activi-
ties that diminish the effectiveness of their votes.8 9 Assuming
that the right to maintain voting power in the political arena in
the face of arbitrary government interference is a right that the
Court has recognized, the allegations in the instant complaint
on a group of voters that challenged a gerrymandered apportionment plan. The plan was
allegedly drawn to place voting district lines in such a way as to reduce or eliminate the
voting leverage of a given group of voters. Id.
The Second Circuit, adopting an unreasonably narrow view of Baker, held that be-
cause the instant plaintiffs did not allege a gerrymandering of voting district lines or
allege that anyone had "stuffed the ballot box with votes for Church-backed candidates
or that anyone ha[d] been prevented from voting," the injuries sustained were not suffi-
ciently particularized and ascertainable to sustain standing. Catholic Conference, 885
F.2d at 1028. See notes 185-96 and accompanying text infra.
185 Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 482 (S.D.N.Y
1982).
18 Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (the right of qualified voters to
vote and have their votes counted is a right secured by the Constitution and thus plain-
tiffs could maintain action asserting that commissioners of elections willfully altered and
falsely counted and certified the ballots of voters).
187 Cf. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915) (the Constitution guarantees the
right to vote for a member of Congress; thus it is illegal for members of the election
board to omit precinct returns from their vote count).
88 Baker, 369 U.S. at 208. Cf. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (the right
to vote is guaranteed by the Constitution, and it is illegal for election officers to stuff a
ballot box in a congressional election).
189 Baker, 369 U.S. at 208 (" 'They are asserting a plain, direct and adequate inter-
est in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes'.... .") (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433, 438 (1939)).
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are strikingly similar to those raised in Baker.
Plaintiffs in this action claimed that allegedly arbitrary gov-
ernment conduct and illegal private conduct have disturbed the
natural representative and electoral processes by creating and
preserving a system which gives members of the public greater
incentive to donate to the Catholic Church than to politically
active abortion rights groups.190 While the plaintiffs did not as-
sert diminished representation or demand increases in actual
representatione'9 -claims that the Second Circuit seems to con-
sider necessary to establish voter standinge 2-they did complain
of arbitrary government interference that disfavored them in the
electoral process. 9 3 As the district court noted:
Plaintiffs' injury is no less real because they claim discrimination
based on issues rather than geography, nor is it relevant that the im-
pact of allegedly harmful government conduct is felt during the battle
over choosing representatives than in the number of representatives
technically available to the aggrieved voters. The bottom line is that
the plaintiffs have alleged government action which has improperly
biased the political process against the discrete group to which they
belong.'
Thus, even in the absence of the specific and discrete math-
ematically demonstrable injury that the Second Circuit probed
for,19 5 the plaintiffs' complaint alleged an injury that the Su-
preme Court has consistently recognized: the right to participate
in the political process on equal terms with all others, free from
arbitrary government interference.19 6 Standing should have been
granted to all the plaintiffs who asserted that the IRS's failure
to enforce the Code diminished their voting power.
4. Competitive Advocate Standing
The final standing theory considered by the Second Circuit
presents possibly the most troubling questions that the court's
190 As the district court pointed out, "each dollar contributed to the Church is worth
more than one given to non-exempt organizations." Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,
544 F. Supp. at 482.
19, Id.
192 See notes 182-83 and accompanying text supra.
193 544 F. Supp. at 482.
19 Id. at 481.
1 Id. at 482.
I" See notes 185-94 and accompanying text supra.
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opinion posed. This theory, not addressed by the district court,
has been dubbed "competitive advocate standing" by the Sec-
ond Circuit.197 Competitive advocate standing is a relatively new
standing theory.'98 According to the Second Circuit, plaintiffs
seeking standing under the competitive advocate the-
ory-"competitive advocates"-may satisfy the Article III case
or controversy requirement by alleging that the "unequal en-
forcement" of a statute provides an unfair advantage to a politi-
cal competitor."9 9 The statement is deceptively simple.
Central to competitive advocate standing is the concept that
"[i]n the inherently competitive political arena an advantage
granted to one competitor automatically constitutes a hardship
to the others. ' 20 0 For the competitive advocate, the hardship
that the unequal enforcement of a statute causes provides the
injury-in-fact necessary for standing.201 This concept of injury
diverges dramatically from the traditional model:20 2 the competi-
tive advocate's injury results from the granting of an unfair ad-
vantage to a competitor, not from the withholding of a benefit
due the plaintiff.20 3
Although competitive advocate standing is a new theory in
name, in practice it can be traced to a well-established line of
federal cases.204 The Second Circuit, in support of its competi-
197 Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028.
193 See note 204 infra.
199 885 F.2d at 1028-29.
200 Id. at 1029 (quoting from Complaint at 1 41).
201 Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. at 974 ("The injury
alleged ... is unequal footing in the political arena ....").
22 See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Election Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir.
1989) ("[T]he loss of competitive advantage flowing from the League's exclusion of Fu.
lani from the national debates constitutes sufficient 'injury' for standing purposes, be-
cause such loss palpably impaired Fulani's ability to compete on an equal footing with
other significant presidential candidates."). Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)
(plaintiffs have no standing to complain simply that the government is violating the law;
they must allege that they personally have been denied equal treatment); Valley Forge,
454 U.S. 464, 482-87 (1982) (plaintiffs must allege personal injury); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (plaintiffs must allege and demonstrate that they personally have
been injured).
203 The plaintiffs who could have benefitted from the competitive advocate analysis
were nonprofit, pro-choice organizations, that were tax-exempt under sections 501(c)(3)
and 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, including ARM, NWHN, Nassau-Now, and
the Women's Center for Reproductive Health.
204 Although the Second Circuit coined the phrase "competitive advocate standing,"
the federal courts of the District of Columbia have developed a theory that, in practice,
is identical to competitive advocate standing. See, e.g., Taxation with Representation v.
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tive advocate theory, relied upon a series of Supreme Court eco-
nomic competitor cases.2 05 These economic competitor cases
arose when banks diversified their functions and began to supply
incidental banking services. The delivery of these services cre-
ated competition between the banks and the firms that had tra-
ditionally supplied these services. 08 The Supreme Court held
that this competition constituted an injury-in-fact and was suffi-
cient to establish standing for the organizations that were losing
business as a result of the banks' new forays into non-banking
functions. 20 7
Regan, 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (alleging that the Internal Revenue Code illegally
subsidized the political activities of veterans' organizations and not those of their com-
petitors), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 540 (1983); International Ass'n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers v. Federal Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir.) (alleging
federal election laws irrationally favor corporate political action committees (PACs) over
union PACs resulting in a diminution of the unions' political influence in federal elec-
tions), afT'd, 459 U.S. 983 (1982); Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C.
1980) (The plaintiffs alleged that discriminatory enforcement of congressional franking
statute, 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1988), subsidized the campaigns of incumbent members of
Congress. The "frank," a stamp that allows members of Congress to use the United
States mail free of charge, may not be used for political purposes. See 39 U.S.C. §
3210(a)(5)(a) (1988)); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974) (alleging that ruling of Internal Revenue Code favors large political contributors
over small in electoral process). The Second Circuit did not cite any of these cases in its
discussion of competitive advocate standing. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-31.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit does not consider
competitive advocate standing a new standing theory. Id. at 1028 ("We consider finally
whether the plaintiffs may have standing under a theory that the district court did not
explicitly consider, yet which derives from its discussion of 'voter standing.' This theory
may be labeled as 'Competitive Advocate Standing.' "). Id. Rather, concentrating on the
effect the discriminatory enforcement of a statute has on the political process, the Sec-
ond Circuit viewed competitive advocate standing as derivative of voter standing. Id.
For a detailed analysis of the genesis of competitive advocate standing see Schwartz,
Standing to Challenge Tax-Exempt Status: The Second Circuit's Competitive Political
Advocate Theory, 58 FoRDHAmi L REv. 723 (1990).
S05 885 F.2d at 1029-30. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987);
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 US.
45 (1970) (per curiam); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orga., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970).
206 While banks may ordinarily engage in "all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking," National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24
(1988), § 1864 of the 1964 National Bank Act provides that "[no bank service corpora-
tion may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1982).
2 0 See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (trade as-
sociation had standing to challenge governmental ruling allowing banks to act as dis-
count brokers); Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 150, 151 (data processors have standing to
challenge banks' expansion into data processing); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 US.
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The Second Circuit relied on these economic competitor
cases in developing its competitive advocate theory, holding that
"political competitors arguably should fare as well as [economic
competitors]. 120s Although the competition in the economic
competitor cases is analogous to the competition under the com-
petitive advocate theory, the two are not entirely reconcilable. In
the economic competitor cases, the plaintiffs alleged that a mis-
interpretation of the National Bank Act allowed third parties to
compete with the plaintiffs in areas in which they had not previ-
ously competed.20 9 A competitive advocate plaintiff, on the other
hand, alleges that an individual or organizations with whom the
plaintiff competes has been conferred an unlawful advantage by
the government. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit indicated, jus-
tifiably, that the Supreme Court's acceptance of competition as
a basis for standing provided sufficient support for the competi-
tive advocate theory.210 A brief synopsis of the instant plaintiffs'
claims will demonstrate the operation of competitive advocate
standing and the Second Circuit's questionable application of
that theory.
In Catholic Conference the plaintiffs alleged that certain
tax-exempt organizations with whom they competed engaged in
political activity in violation of Internal Revenue Code section
501(c)(3). The relevant plaintiffs, a group of section 501(c)(3)
and (c)(4) tax-exempt abortion rights organizations, alleged that
the Catholic Church had endorsed or supported pro-life political
candidates and had opposed pro-choice candidates. 211 It was as-
45, 46 (1970) (travel agents have standing to challenge rule permitting banks to offer
travel services).
208 Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1030. The Supreme Court laid the foundation
for competitive advocate standing in Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 150. The Data Preces-
sing Court pointed out that in a competitor's suit, noneconomic injuries, such as injuries
that are aesthetic, conservational, or spiritual in nature, could be sufficient to confer
standing. Id. at 153-54.
:09 See notes 205-07 and accompanying text supra.
21o Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-31.
211 It was the contention of the plaintiffs that this activity had taken the shape of
articles published in church bulletins, letters distributed to parishioners, and attacks or
endorsements of candidates from the pulpit. Id. at 1022.
The plaintiffs also contended that the Church had urged its members to donate to
and sign petitions of "right to life" candidates and that it had contributed "substantial
sums of money to 'right to life' and other political groups which have, directly or indi.
rectly, supported the political candidacies for public office of persons favoring anti-abor-
tion legislation." Id. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text supra.
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serted that the IRS failed to enforce the Code's prohibition
against lobbying by ignoring these activities.21 2 The IRS, argued
the plaintiffs, was cognizant of these activities and should have
either revoked or refused to renew the Church's section
501(c)(3) status. It was therefore the plaintiffs' position that the
government's failure to enforce the law afforded the Catholic
Church more favorable treatment than organizations that are
pro-choice. The plaintiffs, according to the mandates of section
501(c)(3), could not substantially involve themselves in the po-
litical process. The Church, supposedly subject to the same
mandates, could engage in extensive lobbying. This disparate
treatment translated into a competitive advantage for the
Church through the section 501 tax "subsidy" which concur-
rently diminished the plaintiffs' power, effectiveness, and influ-
ence in the political arena.213
The Second Circuit, in a discussion that attempted to clar-
ify and trace the development of competitive advocate standing,
held that the plaintiffs' alleged injury was not a "direct injury in
fact" sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements.1 4
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs in Catholic Conference
were not competitive advocates because, by refusing to match
the Church's alleged electioneering with their own, they chose,
albeit properly, not to compete.215
212 885 F.2d at 1022.
212 Nowhere did the plaintiffs allege that the IRS penalized them for violating the
Code. Rather, they asserted that they refrained from lobbying and therefore did not
violate the prohibitions embodied in § 501(c)(3). The plaintiffs simply wanted the gov-
ernment to enforce the prohibitions that they obeyed against the Catholic Church. Id.
214 Id. at 1030.
1" Plainly, the whole point of this lawsuit is plaintiffs' contention that it is
illegal for the Catholic Church as a § 501(c)(3) recipient to participate actively
in the political process. And, recognizing that potential illegality and the value
of their own exemptions under §§ 501(c)(3) and (c)(4), plaintiffs state that they
have refused to engage in electioneering to counter the Church's pro-life
stance. Partly as a result of this self-imposed restraint, plaintiffs choae not to
compete.
885 F.2d at 1031. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (strongly held beliefs are
not a substitute for an injury-in-fact); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 225-26 (1974), reversing Richardson v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
411 U.S. 947 (1973) ("motivation is not a substitute for the actual injury needed"). But
see Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("the injury in fact is
the competitive disadvantage the plaintiff organizations are obliged to endure when...
the Catholic Church is permitted to violate the tax laws by using tax-exempt donations
to support the 'anti-abortion' side of the national debate through contributions to like-
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What the court seemed to imply is that the plaintiffs, to
qualify as competitive advocates, should have violated the tax
code.216 This is an indefensible position. As Judge Newman
noted in his dissent, the plaintiffs did not forego electioneering
as a matter of personal preference, but rather out of obedience
to an act of Congress. 217 They should not have been denied com-
petitive advocate standing simply because they obeyed the
law.218 Furthermore, the Second Circuit's position that the
plaintiffs are not competitors of the Church is simply untenable.
As Judge Newman pointed out in his dissent, "[t]he competition
is between those tax-exempt organizations that are abiding by
the limitations of section 501(c)(3) in their advocacy on the
abortion issue and the Catholic Church, which is violating these
limitations in the advocacy of its point of view on the issue." 210
minded political candidates, while the plaintiff organizations must confine their advocacy
of the 'pro-choice' side to those insubstantial lobbying activities that the tax laws
permit.").
216 885 F.2d at 1029; see also note 215 supra. The court also refused to recognize a
competitive advocate theory of standing because "it would be difficult to deny standing
to any person who expressed an opinion contrary to that of the Catholic Church." 885
F.2d at 1030. The dissent pointed out that the majority's reasoning at this point was
entirely unpersuasive. The plaintiffs in this case were not random citizens who disagreed
with the Church's view on the abortion issue. Instead, the plaintiffs were organizations
that advocate a specific point of view. As the dissent noted, "A standing doctrine is en-
tirely within manageable bounds when it recognizes the competition among organizations
all of which are subject to the same statutory restraint and permits law-abiding competi-
tors to challenge government action that enables one organization to violate that re-
straint to the detriment of the others." Id. at 1033 (Newman, J., dissenting). See United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973) ("standing is not to be denied simply
because many people suffer the same injury"). In addition, whether an individual citizen
could challenge the Church's action was a "question far beyond the narrow issue" before
the Second Circuit. 885 F.2d at 1033.
217 885 U.S. at 1033. If the Church, in violating § 501(c)(3), is insulated from attack,
any individual or organization seeking to challenge similar violations will be denied ac-
cess to the federal courts simply because they adhered to the law. Justice Newman
stated that "I fail to understand why any person or organization ... should be denied
access to a federal court for the reasons that it is obeying the law." Id.
218 A plaintiff need not violate a statute to question its constitutionality. The threat
of prosecution may, in and of itself, be sufficient to confer standing. See Babbitt v.
United Farmworkers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (plaintiff who challenges a
statute need not await consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775 (1978) (corporation had stand-
ing to challenge statute forbidding certain expenditures by banks and businesses even if
it was not subject to threat of prosecution); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)
(doctor had standing to maintain action challenging state abortion statute even though
he had not been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution).
219 885 F.2d at 1033 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman strongly disagreed
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"If the words [competitive advocate] are to have any meaning at
all, these plaintiffs are indisputably 'competitive advocates' of
the Catholic Church on the issue of abortion.
' 220
Since competitive advocate standing is a relatively new the-
ory, case law either supporting or weakening the court's decision
is lacking. The only other Second Circuit case to discuss the is-
sue of competitive advocate standing is Fulani v. League of
Women Voters Education Fund.221 Fulani, however, is sufficient
to demonstrate that the Second Circuit incorrectly decided to
deny standing to the plaintiffs in Catholic Conference.
In Fulani a third-party presidential candidate challenged
the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status of the League of Women
Voters (the League), a nonprofit "charitable organization whose
stated goals are to foster voter education and participation in
the electoral process. ' ' 2 2 The essence of Fulani's complaint cen-
tered around three nationally televised political debates organ-
ized and sponsored by the League. Dr. Fulani, a minority candi-
date for President of the United States, sought but was denied
an invitation to these debates.223 The plaintiff contended that
"the League had engaged in impermissible 'partisan' activity
when it denied her the right to participate in the Democratic
and Republican primary debates" in violation of the League's
tax-exempt status.224 Section 501(c)(3) prohibitions against elec-
tioneering, according to the plaintiff, obligated the League to use
nonpartisan criteria in their candidate selection process.2 25
The plaintiff initiated a challenge alleging that, by failing to
enforce section 501(c)(3) against the League, the IRS "unlaw-
fully encouraged and permitted the League" to use its section
with the majority's holding that the § 501(c)(3) organizations did not compete vith the
Catholic Church. The dissent argued that the majority took a "needlessly narrow view of
both the realities of American political life and the contours of the doctrine of competi-
tive advocate standing." Id. at 1032.
20 Id.
-1 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
Fulani, 882 F.2d at 623. In both Fulani and Catholic Conference the plaintiffs
sued the federal government, alleging that discriminatory enforcement of § 501(c)(3) di-
minished their ability to compete in the political arena by granting an advantage to a
competitor.
882 F.2d at 623. "Dr. Fulani attempted to procure an invitation to participate in
these debates, however, the League did not invite her to take part in any of them." Id.
224 Id. at 624.
225 Id. The League stated that it refused to invite Dr. Fulani because she was not
seeking the nomination of either the Democratic or Republican Party. Id. at 623.
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501 tax "subsidy" to promote certain political parties and candi-
dates. 226 Such activities, contended Fulani, distorted the politi-
cal process. A tax exemption was used impermissibly to support
certain candidates and to disadvantage her and her campaign.
Fulani claimed that she was injured because she lost media ex-
posure and any competitive advantage that might have flowed
from her participation in the debates.2 27
The Second Circuit held that the harm alleged by the plain-
tiff was sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement for stand-
ing.228 The court, stating that "[i]t is beyond dispute that partic-
ipation in these debates bestowed on the candidates who
appeared in them some competitive advantage over their non-
participating peers," granted Dr. Fulani competitive advocate
standing.229
Catholic Conference was decided one month later. Given
the factual similarity of the two cases, reconciling the two differ-
ent results is all but impossible.2 " The plaintiffs in Fulani and
Catholic Conference both asserted that their abilities to com-
pete in the electoral process were being diminished.23 1 Both
challenged the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status of competing
organizations, alleging that the federal government was not en-
forcing the prohibitions that section 501 status entails.22 Both
plaintiffs contended that the unequal enforcement of section
501(c)(3) afforded a competitive advantage to their competitors
which thereby diminished the plaintiffs' effectiveness in the po-
226 Id. at 625.
227 Id. Fulani originally sought to enjoin the League from holding any presidential
primary debates without inviting her to participate. Id. at 623. The Second Circuit dis.
cussed only the claim against the federal government in determining standing because, at
the time of the appeal, the debates in question had already been held. Id. at 625,
228 Id. Fulani also claimed that she was injured because she was denied the opportu-
nity to exchange, on equal terms with other political candidates, her political Ideas. Id.
129 Id. at 626.
2"0 See note 236 infra.
21 Id. See also Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[petitioners']
inclusion in the televised debates undoubtedly would have benefited their campaign").
But see Fulani v. Brady, 729 F. Supp. 158, 162-63 (D.D.C. 1990) (alleged injury resulting
from loss of media exposure due to exclusion from presidential debates is too abstract
and speculative to constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing).
Dr. Fulani lost her case on the merits because the court determined that the
League's decision to exclude her from the presidential primary debates did not consti.
tute partisan activity. Fulani, 882 F.2d at 629-30.
222 See notes 9 & 225 and accompanying text supra.
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litical arena. Nevertheless, it is here that the comparison ends.
Dr. Fulani was granted competitive advocate standing; the
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference were not.233
The only meaningful difference between Fulani and Catho-
lic Conference is that the plaintiffs in Catholic Conference were
advocates, not candidates. 3 ' This factual distinction however,
does not affect either the nature or impact of the injuries as-
serted. In both cases plaintiffs claimed that the government, by
failing to enforce a statute, impaired their abilities to participate
in the political process by promoting the interests of their adver-
saries over their own. The Second Circuit did not, in either Fu-
lani or Catholic Conference, assert that competitive advocate
standing was limited to political candidates. Although Fulani's
rejection by the League is a more obvious injury than that suf-
fered by the instant plaintiffs, this difference in degree does not
serve to diminish the fact that the plaintiffs in Catholic Confer-
ence were injured. 35 Thus, beyond the difference in the plain-
tiffs themselves, Fulani and Catholic Conference are virtually
indistinguishable.
After the complaint was dismissed for lack of standing, the
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference sought a rehearing before the
Second Circuit, alleging inconsistency between the opinion in
the instant case and the opinion issued in Fulani.230 The court,
stating simply that "the competition in Fulani is more direct
and immediate tha[n] that shown here," summarily denied the
petition.237
See notes 214-29 and accompanying text supra.
2 See notes 211-29 and accompanying text supra.
See note 218 supra.
236 Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1034.
Appellants have sought rehearing, alleging inconsistency between the opinion
in this case and... Fulani. In Fulani, competitor standing was accorded to a
political candidate to challenge her exclusion from a televised debate in which
her political rivals were invited to participate. A majority of the panel con-
cluded that she suffered sufficient injury to establish standing. In the present
case, though this panel is divided as to whether the plaintiffs are sufficiently in
competition with the Catholic Church to have suffered injury that confers
standing, we are in agreement that the competition in Fulani is more direct
and immediate tha[n] that shown here.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Id. Nowhere does the court explain why the competition in Fulani was "more direct and
immediate" than the competition in Catholic Conference.
23 Id.
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CONCLUSION
The current approach to standing in the federal courts is
characterized by decisions that are inconsistent at worst, uncer-
tain at best. This has created a particularly serious problem for
plaintiffs desiring to challenge administrative agency action.
Agency action is pervasive in the administrative state that
oversees so many aspects of our lives. Nevertheless, third-party
plaintiffs, often indirectly injured by these agencies, have found
it increasingly difficult to challenge unjust statutory interpreta-
tions and administrative efforts due to restrictive, unpredictable
standing requirements.
This Comment exposes the flexibility of the standing doc-
trine and the potential for abuse that accompanies that flexibil-
ity. Federal courts, confronted with socially, politically, or eco-
nomically sensitive cases, can use this flexibility to avoid hearing
the merits of such cases. Standing requirements, unclear in their
purest form, can rarely be alleged with sufficient particularity to
overcome a court's desire to steer clear of controversial litiga-
tion. Such a fate befell the plaintiffs in Catholic Conference.
The competitive advocate and voter plaintiffs asserted particu-
lar, ascertainable injuries. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit, per-
haps motivated by desires not to alienate the Church and to
elude the abortion controversy currently embroiling our nation,
held that they did not. Our federal courts ought to allow plain-
tiffs to use standing as a means by which an injured individual
can have a grievance heard and redressed. Although standing is,
inherently, a limiting doctrine, it should not be used as a shield
behind which our courts, afraid of controversy, hide.
Norman Leon
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